




Migration flows in Europe

Before and During the COVID-19 Crisis

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A BWI Discussion Paper



BWI
Building and Wood
Workers' International
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BWI is the Global Union Federation grouping free and democratic unions with members in the Building, Building Materials, Wood, Forestry and Allied sectors.

BWI brings together around 334 trade unions representing around 12 million members in 130 countries. The Headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland while the Regional Offices are in Panama, Malaysia, and South Africa.

Our mission is to defend and advance workers' rights, and to improve working and living conditions in our sectors. The BWI, above all, has a rights-based approach. We believe that trade union rights are human rights and are based on equality, solidarity and democracy, and that trade unions are indispensable to good governance.

BWI goals include 1) to promote and defend human and trade union rights; 2) to increase trade union strength; 3) to promote a stable and high level of employment in our sectors; and 4) to influence policy and strengthen the capacity of institutions and tripartite structures in our sectors.

Introduction

Even before the COVID-19 crisis, migration continued to be a contentious issue in Europe and remains on top of the political agenda across the region. While balanced debates on the issue were not absent, political rhetoric and public discourse on migration have at times been dominated by anti-immigrant sentiments. Over the course of 2017 and 2018, far-right wing groups across Europe promoted myths or “fake news” about migration. This was most evident in the coordinated online campaigns against the Global Compact for Migration by far-right activists, including through social media, online petitions and videos. General attitudes toward immigration also remain polarized, while negative anti-immigration political rhetoric continues to take place in several national elections across Europe.

With the rise of far right-wing groups in Europe, most European countries continue to face major challenges either as countries sending migrant workers or as the receiving countries of destination. Regarding the first group of countries, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Latvia experienced the steepest population decline from migration. In Moldova 41 percent of families have at least one family member working abroad.

According to the IOM, Northern and Western Europe, where most of the migrant destination countries are located, faced major challenges due to irregular migration and human trafficking for labour and sexual exploitation. Also, free movement in Europe faced challenges by the refugee crisis in 2015. The arrival of large numbers of migrants and refugees to Europe put pressure on the common European asylum system and affected the functioning of the Schengen rules. This led to a temporary suspension of the Dublin system and the introduction of border checks by several member States, and made many of the border countries with the European Union to serve as a filter barrier for refugees seeking to access the EU (Balkan countries, Turkey).

The COVID-19 crisis is deepening already existing problems with migration issues in Europe. It further challenged free movement in Europe, highlighted gaps in the legislation of migrant workers’ host countries and “hunger” for migrant workers in Western Europe. Once again, the variability of migrant workers was exposed to society and governments.

The goal of this paper is to analyse recent migration trends in EU\EFTA countries, EUEA countries, Balkan countries, CIS countries, Turkey, the UK and identify main migration trends in the region before and during the COVID-19 crisis. This fact-finding analysis should serve as a basis for the BWI affiliates to build policies to protect migrant workers’ rights in a post-COVID-19 world.

The research analysis is based on the most recent available reports and surveys of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), research by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), academic researchers, reports by the European Commission and civil society organizations, and mass media publications.

Migration flows in Europe before the COVID-19 crisis

Global trends

The latest available estimates before the COVID-19 crisis indicate that there were roughly 164 million migrant workers around the world in 2017, accounting for nearly two thirds (64%) of the (then) 258 million global stock of international migrants. When compared with the global population of international migrants of working age – regarded as 15 years of age or older (234 million) – migrant workers account for 70 percent.

In 2017, 68 percent of migrant workers were residing in high-income level countries – an estimated 111 million people. An additional 47 million migrant workers (29%) were living in middle-income countries, and 5.6 million (3.4%) were in low-income countries. In 2017 there was a noticeable change in the destination country category; that is, from 2013 to 2017, high-income countries experienced a 7 percentage point drop in migrant workers (from 75% to 68%), while upper-middle-income countries recorded a 7 percentage point increase (from 12% to 19%).

Male migrant workers outnumbered female migrant workers by 28 million in 2017, with 96 million males (58%) and 68 million females (42%), in a context where males comprised a higher number of international migrants of working age (127 million or 54%, compared with 107 million or 46% females).

In 2018, India, China, Mexico, the Philippines and Egypt were (in descending order) the top five remittance-recipient countries, although India and China were well above the others, with total inward remittances exceeding USD 67 billion for both countries. When remittances are viewed as a percentage of gross domestic product, however, the top five remittance-receiving countries in 2018 were Tonga (at 35.2%), followed by Kyrgyzstan (33.6%), Tajikistan (31%), Haiti (30.7%) and Nepal (28%).

In 2018, for the fifth consecutive year, Turkey was the largest host country in the world, with 3.7 million refugees, mainly Syrians (over 3.6 million). Reflecting the significant share of Syrians in the global refugee population, two other bordering countries – Jordan and Lebanon – also were among the top 10. Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran were also among the top 10 refugee-hosting countries, as the two principal hosts of refugees from Afghanistan, the second largest origin country. Uganda, Sudan, Germany, Bangladesh and Ethiopia comprised the others. The vast majority of refugees were hosted in neighbouring countries. According to UNHCR, the least-developed countries – such as Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen – hosted 33 percent of the global total (6.7 million refugees). It is only when refugees are measured against national populations that high-income countries, such as Sweden (seventh) and Malta (ninth), rank among the top 10.

Most countries with internally displaced persons (IDP) in 2018 were either in the Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa. The Syrian Arab Republic had the highest number of people displaced due to conflict (6.1 million) at the end of 2018, followed by Colombia (5.8 million). The Democratic Republic of the Congo had the third largest number with 3.1 million, followed by Somalia (2.6 million) and Afghanistan (2.6 million). Over 30 million (nearly 75%) of the global total of 41.3 million displaced people live in just 10 countries. In terms of proportion of national population, the Syrian Arab Republic, whose conflict has dragged on for multiple years, had over 30 percent of its population displaced due to conflict and violence. Somalia had the second highest proportion (18%), followed by the Central African Republic and Colombia (both over 10%) (International Organization for Migration 2019).

Table 1. Global trends

<p>The number of international migrants globally in 2019: 272 million (3.5% of the world's population – 2.8% in 2000)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ 52 percent of international migrants were male; 48 per cent were female ▶ 74 percent of all international migrants were of working age (20-64 years).
<p>India continued to be the largest country of origin of international migrants</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ India had the largest number of migrants living abroad (17.5 million), followed by Mexico and China (11.8 million and 10.7 million respectively). ▶ The top destination country remained the United States (50.7 million international migrants).
<p>The number of migrant workers declined slightly in high-income countries while increasing elsewhere</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Between 2013 and 2017, high-income countries experienced a slight drop in migrant workers (from 112.3 million to 111.2 million). Upper middle-income countries had the biggest increase (from 17.5 million to 30.5 million). ▶ Globally, male migrant workers outnumbered female migrant workers by 28 million in 2017. There were 96 million male migrant workers (58%) and 68 million female migrant workers (42%).
<p>International remittances increased to USD 689 billion in 2018</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ The top 3 recipients of remittances were India (USD 78.6 billion), China (USD 67.4 billion) and Mexico (USD 35.7 billion). ▶ The United States remained the top country sending remittances (USD 68.0 billion) followed by the United Arab Emirates (USD 44.4 billion) and Saudi Arabia (USD 36.1 billion).
<p>The global refugee population was 25.9 million in 2018</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ 20.4 million refugees were under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 5.5 million were refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East. ▶ 52 percent of the global refugee population was under 18 years of age.
<p>The number of internally displaced persons due to violence and conflict reached 41.3 million</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ This was the highest number recorded since the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre began monitoring in 1998. ▶ The Syrian Arab Republic had the highest number of people displaced (6.1 million) followed by Colombia (5.8 million) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (3.1 million).
<p>The number of global stateless persons in 2018 was 3.9 million</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Bangladesh had the largest number of stateless persons (around 906,000). It was followed by Côte d'Ivoire (692,000) and Myanmar (620,000).

Source: IOM World Migration Report 2020

Migration to Europe: general trends

Over 80 million international migrants lived in Europe in 2019, an increase of nearly 7 percent since 2015, when 75 million international migrants resided in the region. A little over half of these (42 million) were born in Europe but were living elsewhere in the region; while this number has only moderately increased since 2015, it was much lower in 1990, at around 28 million. From 2015 to 2019, the population of non-European migrants in Europe increased from a little over 35 million to around 38 million.

Several European countries have experienced large changes in the size of their populations over the last decade. While some countries, such as Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland experienced population

growth, others underwent substantial population decline over the last 10 years. Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Latvia experienced the steepest population declines (more than 10%). Low fertility rates are the most important driver of negative population change in parts of Europe. However, negative net migration, where the number of emigrants exceeds the number of immigrants, has also contributed to population decline on the continent, especially in countries such as Lithuania and Latvia.

Many countries in the east of Europe – such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Poland and Romania – have some of the largest emigrant populations within the region. At over 10 million emigrants in 2019, the Russian Federation had the largest population of its citizens living abroad in Europe. After the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom had the third and fourth largest European emigrant population (4.4 million and 4.3 million respectively). Bosnia and Herzegovina had the highest share of emigrants in comparison with the resident population in 2019. Portugal and Bulgaria, two countries that have long histories of emigration, also had high shares of populations abroad.

With over 13 million migrants in 2019, Germany had the largest foreign-born population of any country in Europe; the number of immigrants in the country increased by nearly 3 million between 2015 and 2019. The largest groups came from Poland, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and the Syrian Arab Republic. The populations of the United Kingdom and France included over 9.5 million and around 8 million foreign-born people, respectively, in 2019. Migrants born in French-speaking North African countries made up some of the largest foreign-born populations in France. In the United Kingdom, some of the largest migrant populations were from India, Poland and Pakistan.

With foreign-born populations of around 6 million, Italy and Spain were the fifth and sixth most popular migrant destinations in Europe in 2019; both countries experienced slight increases in the number of foreign-born migrants since 2015. Many of the foreign-born populations in these countries came from elsewhere in Europe – such as Romania, Albania and Germany – or from North African countries such as Morocco. The migration of people from countries of the former Soviet Union – such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – accounted for some of the largest European migrant corridors. Among European countries Switzerland had the highest share of migrants in its population (29.9%) followed by Sweden (20%), Austria (19.9%) and Belgium (17.2%).

In 2018, Germany continued to host the largest population of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and the fifth largest in the world. The largest number of refugees in Germany came from the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Afghanistan. France and Sweden were the second and third largest hosts of refugees in Europe, with over 368,000 and over 248,000, respectively. Ukraine and the Russian Federation produced the largest refugee population in Europe at the end of 2018, around 93,000 and 61,000 respectively.

Most new internal displacements in 2018 in Europe were the result of disasters, not conflict. Ukraine was the only country in Europe with new conflict-related internal displacements in 2018, with an estimated 12,000 new displacements due to conflict and violence during the year. The rest of the new internal displacements were triggered by disasters, with Greece recording the largest number of disaster-induced displacements (9,200) followed by France (6,300). Both countries suffered from significant floods and storms. The Russian Federation, Spain and Italy recorded over 3,000 new disaster displacements in 2018.

Irregular migration continues to pose challenges to the region, and remained high on the European agenda in 2017 and 2018. By the end of 2018, the largest number of irregular maritime arrivals to Europe used the Western Mediterranean route, which leads to Spain. This marked a change from 2016 and 2017, when irregular maritime migrants arrived to Europe in the greatest numbers via the Central Mediterranean route from Libya (mainly to Italy) or from Turkey to Greece on the Eastern Mediterranean route. In 2018, over 117,000 and more than 26,000 migrants arrived in Europe by sea and land, respectively. There were around 59,000 sea arrivals in Spain and 23,370 in Italy in the same year. More than 2,000 migrants died in the Mediterranean in 2018, with the Central Mediterranean route by far the deadliest route for irregular migrants in 2018 (over 1,300 deaths). While the number of migrants who died at sea trying to reach Europe dropped in 2018 due to fewer overall crossings, the death ratio along the Central Mediterranean route increased from 2.6% in 2017 to 3.5% in 2018 and, by April 2019, it had reached 10 per cent. A large number of maritime arrivals in 2018 came from countries that continue to be affected by violence and conflict, including Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, especially to Greece. North and sub-Saharan Africans also continued to make up a significant portion of migrant flows to Europe, especially to Italy and Spain.

Human trafficking remains a major challenge in Europe, and the region has seen a rise in both trafficking for labour and sexual exploitation. Trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation remains the predominant form of human trafficking in Europe (56%), followed by labour exploitation (26%) and other forms of exploitation, such as forced begging or organ removal (18%). Women and girls continue to be the most vulnerable group (68% of victims), often exploited in care and domestic work and forced prostitution. Two important trends reported by EU Member States are the sharp increase in child trafficking (23% of all victims) and the growth of intra-EU trafficking (44% of victims are EU citizens). Profiles of traffickers and their modus operandi have changed, with an observed increase in the number of women and younger perpetrators and a growing role of Internet and social media in recruitment and distribution of exploitation materials. Despite growing awareness and knowledge of trafficking practices, prosecution and conviction rates remain low. Irregular migrants are especially vulnerable, as traffickers often take advantage of their status to lock them into cycles of exploitation. In 2018, a case of migrant fishermen working on Irish-registered trawlers was brought to the Republic of Ireland's High Court; some of the migrants were believed to have been trafficked and worked under harsh conditions, including being racially-abused, underpaid and overworked (International Organization for Migration 2019).

Table 2. Migration in Europe: general trends

Non-EU migrants in Europe in 2019	38 million people
EU migrants in Europe in 2019	42 million people
Countries in Europe with population growth	Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland
Countries in Europe with population decline	Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Latvia
Countries with largest emigrate population	Russian Federation, Ukraine, Poland, the UK, Romania
Countries with the largest foreign-born population	Germany, the UK, France, Spain, Italy
Country with the largest population of refugees and asylum seekers	Germany
Countries with the largest internally-displaced persons	Russian Federation, Ukraine, Spain, Italy
Countries of origin for the irregular migrants	Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, North and Sub-Saharan African countries

Source: IOM World Migration Report 2020

Intra-EU labour migration (mobility)

The latest developments confirm that intra-EU mobility continues to grow, but at a slower pace than in previous years. In 2018, there were 17.6 million EU-28 citizen-movers within the EU. The stock of EU movers of working-age grew by only 3.4% in 2018, in comparison to the average of 5% in previous years.

The EU-LFS indicates a figure of 11.7 million EU movers of working age, out of which active movers made up 83% (9.7 million in 2018), a 2% increase from 2017. In addition, there were 1.5 million cross-border workers in the EU. Around half of all EU movers reside in either Germany or the UK and a further quarter reside in Spain, Italy or France. Romania, Poland, Italy, Portugal and Bulgaria remained the five most important sending countries in 2018.

Net mobility of EU-28 movers, while remaining positive, continued to decrease in 2017 (-18%). Net mobility of nationals of EU Member States remained negative, nevertheless the share of those who returned

compared to those who left in 2017 increased to 72% (66% in 2016), meaning that for every four persons who leave, three return.

The employment rate of EU movers increased from 76% in 2017 to 77% in 2018, 3 percentage points above that of nationals in the host countries. Also, EU movers' unemployment rate, while declining to 7%, remained 1 percentage point higher than that of nationals of the host countries. When comparing employment rates of EU movers to those of citizens in their countries of origin who did not move, those who moved were more likely to be employed than those who did not. In most Member States, EU-28 movers are also less likely to be unemployed than those remaining at home.

The main sectors of employment for EU movers in 2018 were, similar to the previous year, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, construction and accommodation and food services and, compared to 2017, a significant gain of employed movers was found in the IT sector (+ 14%).

Across the EU, 36% of active EU-28 movers have high education levels, 40% have medium and 23% have lower education levels. A fifth of EU movers are employed in low-skill or elementary occupations that require only a lower secondary degree; another fifth are employed in high-skill occupations. The remaining movers are employed in occupations with medium skill level requirements.

Regarding the length of mobility spells, data showed that among those movers who stayed in their host country for at least one year ("long-term movers"), over 50% stayed only between one and four years. Furthermore, mobility of a few years (one to four years) increased significantly since 2004.

A similar trend can be observed in short-term mobility (moving for less than 12 months): the number of short-term movers increased in total and as a proportion of all movers since 2004. However, there are country differences when compared to long-term mobility: whereas short-term mobility increased much stronger than long-term mobility in Germany, the opposite was true for the UK. Furthermore, posting of workers – which can be considered a special form of short-term mobility, given that the average length of posting is three months – almost doubled in volume since 2011 (European Commission 2020).

Table 3. Intra-EU labour migration (mobility)

Total number of EU-28 movers	17.6 million
Number of EU movers of working age	11.7 million
Top destination countries	Germany, UK, Spain, Italy, France
Top sending countries	Romania, Poland, Italy, Portugal and Bulgaria
Main sectors of employment	Manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, construction, accommodation and food services, IT sectors
Education level of EU-movers	36% of active EU-28 movers have high education levels, 40% medium and 23% lower education levels
Employment occupations	A fifth of EU movers are employed in low-skill or elementary occupations; another fifth are employed in high-skill occupations. The remaining movers are employed in occupations with medium-level skill requirements.

Source: 2019 Annual Report on Intra-EU labour mobility

Migration flows to/from Balkan countries

The EU's externalisation of migration and border management to the Western Balkans stands in sharp contrast with its long-standing goal of a stabilisation of the region pursued in the framework of the EU's enlargement process. The process of externalisation of EU borders to the region began before the so-called "refugee crisis" hit the headlines in 2015. Migration management has been a prominent issue in

EU-Western Balkan relations since the early 2000s through the EU's use of the quid-pro-quo strategy involving visa facilitation and readmission agreements as well as the enlargement process, which in some cases ran in parallel.

Visa facilitation and readmission agreements between the EU and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia entered into force between 2006 and 2008, offering speeded up visa procedures for citizens of those countries in exchange for stepped up migration cooperation, primarily aiming to curb irregular migration to the EU.

With the unfolding of the so-called "refugee crisis" in Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean route became the focus of the challenge. First, EU member states undertook actions to reduce the flow, both as a bloc and bilaterally as single countries. The EU-Turkey Statement, signed in March 2016, and the progressive strengthening of EU border controls neighbouring the Western Balkans led to a drastic drop in the number of migrants and refugees arriving in the EU via this route.

Secondly, the EU pursued a more effective border control regime in the region. Based on a reinforced mandate agreement for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA), signed in October 2016, and following draft agreements with countries of the region, the Agency was able to provide assistance and carry out operational activities in the region.

While the number of migrants crossing the region was significantly reduced, these interventions resulted in accumulation of migrants in certain areas and undue pressure on domestic systems in certain countries. At the end of 2017, the main route simply moved to Northern Albania, Montenegro and BiH. Yet, the strict controls at the Croatian border turned BiH into a bottleneck.

Bosnian authorities registered 21,163 migrants illegally entering the country in 2018. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), only a small number of migrants entering BiH desire to stay in the country and instead seek to reach Western EU countries, which are attractive not only for economic opportunities, but also for existing family and social ties. Moreover, most of the countries of the region were unprepared to deal with refugees due to a structural lack of facilities and resources. In the case of BiH, considering a total population of 3.5 million and an economy still recovering from the civil war, the state is unable to deliver necessary assistance and services for new or existing migrants in the country. Above all, BiH lacks a system able to host migrants and EU funding cannot fill the structural gaps because in addition to money, manpower and technical support are needed to address inadequacies in migration management.

From a regional perspective, the EU's externalisation of migration management is also adding stress and tensions between states in a region where unresolved territorial disputes and a still delicate balance between different forces continue to pose a threat (Liperi 2019).

Two of the critical issues facing migrant workers from Balkan countries are human trafficking and labour exploitation. For example, mass media and civil society organizations reported that in 2007-2009 about 700 workers from BiH, Serbia and Northern Macedonia were most severely exploited working on construction of state capital facilities in Baku, Azerbaijan (ASTRA 2019).

Migration flows from Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine

As a result of the European Union Association Agreements, liberalisation of the visa regime has taken place for citizens of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, allowing them visa-free entry to the Schengen countries. This visa-free regime has opened up the European labour market for workers from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, thus making their domestic labour markets vulnerable. Since the Association Agreement provisions do not stipulate any specific commitments for the signatories in terms of wage levels, wages in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine remain persistently low. This forces millions of workers to seek employment in EU countries. Additionally, significant price hikes for energy and utility services observed in these three countries have reduced citizens' incomes even further.

Based on the survey on migration and human trafficking in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Georgia conducted in 2017-2019, it is possible to draw main conclusions regarding labour migration from Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine.

Of the three countries, the highest percentage of families with external labour migrants was observed in Moldova (near 41%), near 10% in Ukraine and 9% in Georgia. In absolute numbers more than 1 million workers from Ukraine went abroad: this number is reflected in official statistics, however IOM estimates that over 3 million Ukrainians work abroad. According to the official statistics over half a million workers from Moldova were abroad as well as nearly a quarter million from Georgia. IOM estimates that over one million Moldavian workers went abroad. In Moldova there is the greatest potential for labour migration to grow, as every fifth worker stated that they were planning to find jobs abroad. In Ukraine and in Georgia this potential is growing as well.

The most desired three categories of jobs abroad for workers from Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine in 2019 were related to qualified work in professional, domestic and construction work.

In 2019 for workers from Georgia the three most desired destination countries were Poland, the USA and Italy; for workers from Moldova they were Germany, Italy, Russian Federation; and for workers from Ukraine they were Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic (International Organization for Migration 2019).

Table 4. Migration from Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine

	Georgia	Moldova	Ukraine
Percent of families with external labour migrants	9%	41%	10%
Number of migrant workers in 2019	223,000	542,000 (1,000,000 IOM estimates)	1,051,000 (3,000,000 IOM estimates)
Desired countries of destinations	Poland, the USA, Italy	Germany, Italy, Russian Federation	Germany, Poland, Czech Republic

Source: Survey on migration and human trafficking in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Georgia.

Migration in CIS countries

The Russian Federation remains the major destination country in the CIS sub region (the second biggest in Europe and the fourth in the world). In 2019, the country received around 11.6 million international migrants.

Most migrants have come from neighbouring countries, most notably members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Immigrants from Ukraine comprised the largest number of foreign-born residents in the Russian Federation (over 3 million), followed by Kazakhstan (around 2.5 million) and Uzbekistan (1.1 million). The Russian Federation's large number of international migrants, many of whom are labour migrants, means that the country is also one of the biggest origins of remittances in the world. In 2018, remittances from the Russian Federation amounted to USD 21 billion, owing to the slow and steady rebound of the country's economy that continues to attract labour migrants. The biggest migrant sending countries are Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the second and the third world biggest remittance-recipient countries, when remittances are viewed as the percentage of GDP.

Along with the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan is the major destination for labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan. In 2019, Ukraine also had a significant number of foreign-born residents at around 5 million, with migrants originating in large part from Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan.

Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia are members of the Eurasian Economic Union Customs Union (EAEU CU). When the EAEU was created, the common Customs Union (unlike under its predecessor, the EAEC) became an integral part thereof, with all member-states automatically joining it the moment of joining the EAEU. According to Article 4 of the EAEU Treaty signed on May 29, 2014, the Customs Union ensures free movement of goods, services, capital and workforce - the "four freedoms" - as well as the implementation of coordinated, agreed, or common policies in branches of economy.

The majority of experts share an opinion that this economic union is, largely, a political superstructure rather than a common economic space. At the same time, the fact that workers from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia do not require a work permit to be able to work in Russia contributes to the massive migration of labour to Russia, which leaves the national labour markets weakened. Also, the EAEU Treaty does not regulate migration processes and does not cover the issues of wages and working conditions.

Examples of EU countries' migration legislation and practice

The legal migration channels for work open to low-skilled and middle-skilled migrants tend to be highly demand-driven. The role of the government in managing these labour migration systems varies significantly among countries in Europe. Sweden is the one example of a government that takes an employer-oriented approach to managing labour migration flows, granting companies broad discretion to hire labour migrants from third countries for any profession and at any skill level provided the job offer is in line with Swedish collective agreements for that occupation. This market-led approach leaves the government with relatively little leeway to control the scale or profile of admissions. Spain, Italy, Germany and France also rely on demand-driven approaches, but their governments have assumed a more state-led approach to managing labour migration flows and shaping the profile of who is allowed to enter and on what terms. Like most high-income countries, they rely on a range of measures to influence the recruitment of foreign workers, including labour market tests, shortage-occupation lists, quotas, short-term admissions and selection based on cooperation with third countries. These approaches are usually not used in isolation but in combination.

Most high-income countries (including Germany, Italy, France and Spain) use labour market tests to verify that employers cannot fill a vacancy with a local worker. This is a means of maintaining control over the process of recruiting foreign workers. These tests also protect the domestic labour force from undue competition in terms of salary or working conditions. Labour market tests require employers to publicly advertise each job opening, including job requirements, qualifications needed and sometimes the salary, to verify that no local workers can meet the demand. Employers usually have to post this advertisement with national, regional or local employment services and the EU's job mobility portal (EURES). They may also have to use other channels such as local newspapers and specialised websites and they may be required to pay for these in a number of countries.

In Spain, an employer seeking to recruit a foreign worker is required to first advertise the position through the local public employment office for 25 days before notifying that office of the outcome of the recruitment process. In the case of a negative outcome, the office will certify that there are no local workers qualified to perform the duties required by the job, subject to final review by the Secretary of State for Migration.

Shortage occupation lists collate in-demand occupations to allow employers in specific sectors to hire foreign workers more easily. These lists can be used as a basis for bypassing complex labour market tests (or, in the case of points-based systems, for favouring migrants who are qualified to work in shortage occupations). In France and Spain, employers looking to hire people in these shortage occupations can bypass labour market tests and thus recruit workers more quickly. Spain introduced its shortage occupation list as a way to speed up the recruitment process.

Numerical limits for certain sectors, admission channels or labour migration systems as a whole can provide a greater degree of control over both the number and profile of labour migrants arriving each year. However, the key question is whether these quotas serve as a strict upper limit or as a target – and what to do if demand outstrips supply. If governments struggle to forecast what labour or skills shortages they may face, the task of setting appropriate quotas seems even more difficult. For some countries, these quotas may cap the number of residence and work permits that can be issued to non-EU foreign workers.

In addition to measures to shape the scale or profile of labour migration, governments can also opt to admit some workers on a very short-term basis or for recurring – though strictly temporary – periods. Most of the countries in Europe admit low and middle-skilled workers on an initially temporary basis, these workers typically do not have access to opportunities for longer-term residence beyond the provisions to facilitate re-entry for multiple seasons. This approach is used for workers who are needed on a short-term, seasonal basis in the agriculture, construction, horticulture, hospitality and tourism sectors, for instance.

Spain primarily recruits seasonal workers through its Collective Management System. In doing so, it relies on countries with which it has signed a bilateral agreement on managing labour migration flows, such as Morocco. This system allows autonomous communities to customise their schemes according to local needs. However, since the economic crisis the quota set under the Collective Management System has been drastically reduced. On the other hand, due to a recent recovery in certain sectors of the Spanish economy, including the agricultural sector, admissions for seasonal work have started to increase again. The French system is similar, as it is based on well-established cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia, countries which provide most of the seasonal workers coming to France every year. French employers can thus build on solid networks with these two countries.

In Italy, the government sets quotas for seasonal workers and cooperates with selected partner countries. The economic downturn led to massive cuts in the number of slots available in Italy's quota system, from 80 000 slots in 2007 to 17,000 in 2017. Sweden, on the other hand, does not use bilateral agreements, but migrant networks and established links between employers and recruitment agencies in Thailand have led to a de facto migration corridor emerging between Sweden and Thailand for berry pickers. Germany's labour migration system in principle follows a universalist approach without offering preferential access to nationals from groups of third countries though there are some exceptions, most notably the Western Balkans Regulation and a range of small-scale pilot projects with third countries.

Another option for governments looking to shape the profile of labour migration flows are country-specific approaches, which are often combined with other approaches as detailed above, for example by reserving part of a quota for nationals of certain origin countries or giving them privileged access to available channels by lowering entry requirements. This country-specific approach may be motivated by shared historical, cultural or economic ties, or it may be informed by more contemporary foreign policy, economic or migration management priorities (The Expert Council's Research Unit (SVR Research Unit)/Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPI Europe) 2019)).

COVID-19 crisis impact on migration flows in Europe

Global trends

Anti COVID-19 measures have brought global economic activities to a near standstill. Such simultaneous suspension of activities in all parts of the world is unprecedented in modern history. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the world economy is expected to contract by 3 percent in 2020 in the baseline scenario, a change of nearly 6 percent compared with 2019. Advanced economies are projected to decline by 6.1 percent and emerging market and developing economies by 1.0-2.2 percent in 2020. Also, there is substantial risk of continued economic recession well into 2021. The worst-case scenario anticipates even lower growth (IMF 2020).

When viewed through a migration lens, the economic crisis induced by COVID-19 could be even longer, deeper, and more pervasive than these estimates imply. Hundreds of countries have implemented coronavirus-related travel restrictions and border shutdowns, creating an unprecedented impact on mobility. COVID-19 also poses a grave threat to the many people caught between home and their final destination when it spread – and they had to stay in crowded refugee camps where the term “social distancing” carried little meaning. Some countries, like Australia, have barred entry to anyone who is not a citizen or resident. Others, like the US, have suspended entry of people from certain places. Some countries have made exemptions for “essential” workers – for Canada, that includes caregivers and seafood processors.

In host countries, the COVID-19 crisis has created additional challenges in sectors that depend on the availability of migrant workers, such as construction and agriculture. The crisis has presented a challenge for the cross-sectoral mobility of workers, which could be particularly hard for lower-skilled migrant workers, especially informal and undocumented workers. During the global financial crisis in 2008, many migrant workers moved from construction to agriculture and retail. Such intersectoral movement may be difficult

at this time because the sectors that need more workers - such as health and information technology - require specific skills and prior training.

Migration flows are likely to fall but the stock of international migrants may not decrease immediately. In 2019, there were around 272 million international migrants (including 26 million refugees). Under normal circumstances, migrants losing jobs would consider returning home. However, that has become impossible for many people because of travel bans and the suspension of transportation services. As a result, the rate of voluntary return migration is likely to fall, except in the case of a few cross-border migration corridors in the South (such as Venezuela-Colombia, Nepal-India, Zimbabwe-South Africa, Myanmar-Thailand) In other words, more people will stay on in their host country more than is typical.

The COVID-19 pandemic has placed many internal migrant workers in dire conditions, many losing their (mostly informal) jobs and unable to return home due to disruption to public transport services and movement restrictions. This is the reality for most migrant workers, especially those working in the informal sector and living in overcrowded slums (for example in India and China) (KNOMAD 2020).

Migration in Europe: general trends

In 2019, before the COVID-19 crisis, Europe accommodated 38 million non-EU migrants and 42 million EU-migrants. Europe was the second region hit hardest by the pandemic and implemented substantial measures to contain the virus, including border closers, travel restrictions, lockdowns and quarantine regimens. That resulted situation when millions of migrants have been stranded in countries that closed their borders. In many cases migrant workers who were locked in the host countries were the first ones to lose their jobs in non-essential industries.

Many people who were caught between home and their final destination when anti-COVID-19 measures were implemented were locked down in crowded refugee camps. The situation has been aggravated by the fact that during 2020 irregular migrant workers continued to arrive in Europe. During 2020, up to 26 April, a total of 19,827 people were recorded as arriving irregularly in EU countries by land or by sea along the three Mediterranean routes and 256 people were recorded as dead or missing in the Mediterranean crossing in 2020.

The inadequate system for processing asylum applications across Europe has led to many such camps in Europe, endangering the lives of people who already have fled hardship. Amnesty International reports that 37,000 refugees and asylum seekers reside in camps in Greece, though these camps have been designed only for 6,095 people. Access to food, toilets and showers is hampered as a result, with insufficient medical personnel to support the needs of these people living in precarious conditions. As the spread of COVID-19 has accelerated, the camps in Greece are at a serious risk of spreading the infection and hitting people hard that simply have no chance to respect the rules of hygiene or to isolate themselves. The most recent situation at the Turkish- Greek border revealed the situation of migrants stuck at the border in conditions completely unacceptable at any time. The Turkish government reversed its initial decision to open its borders and people were put at significant risk with potential catastrophic results given the facile way in which the virus could be transmitted among masses of people.

The EU Asylum Support Office announced on April 30, 2020 that the number of asylum applications had decreased by almost half from the previous month, when measures to combat the corona virus were strengthened. The Support Office announced that 34,737 asylum applications were submitted in 31 European countries in March, 43 percent less than in February. However, that office stated that just before the pandemic hit Europe, the number of asylum requests had risen to 65,300, while in the same period in 2019 it was 61,100.

Many migrant workers come to Europe from poorer Eastern European countries. Migrants who were on home leave or travelling out of their host country (including for visa renewal) when the travel bans came into place were unable to return to their jobs and were forced to stay in their home countries unemployed and with very poor welfare and social protection systems in place.

The lockdown of migrant workers in their home countries revealed the importance of migrant workers in many occupations. During the time of lockdown, it became evident that migrant workers are among “key workers” who perform “essential functions” needed to keep European citizens healthy and safe and

to have continued access to basic services. The share of migrant key workers fluctuates around 20% in countries such as Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Austria. In Italy, about 28% of agricultural workers are migrants and 53% of them are from another EU country, mainly from Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Poland, while the rest come from outside the EU, many of them undocumented (Dempster 2020).

As springtime was approaching, European countries, at standstill, became increasingly in need for migrant workers. At the end of March, the UK urgently needed to fill 90,000 positions to pick crops. In Italy, around 370,000 seasonal workers were needed to plant and harvest agri-food products. Similarly 150,000 in Spain, 276,000 in France and 300,000 in Germany, according to farmer associations. The forestry sector in Europe also needs seasonal workers. It is estimated that Europe needs between 800,000 and one million seasonal workers each year.

The pandemic has exposed some of the pre-existing cost and benefit asymmetries across Europe that have widely different economic realities. In an open letter dated March 31, the Bulgarian trade union Podkrepa demanded that the Bulgarian government either stop workers from leaving the country – by providing them with minimal basic income during the crisis – or to pressure receiving countries into protecting the economic rights and health of workers and to not send them back to Bulgaria before the crisis ends. So far, neither of these measures has been taken.

It is worth highlighting that dramatic loss of income among migrant workers resulted in a dramatic drop in remittances to the countries of origin. It is estimated that remittances to migrant sending countries in Europe and Central Asia will fall significantly, by about 28 percent in 2020, due to the combined effect of the global coronavirus pandemic and tumbling oil prices (KNOMAD 2020).

Table 5. Major challenges for migrant workers in Europe during COVID-19 crisis

▶ Travel restrictions and border closure
▶ Limited access to social security and health care systems
▶ Poor living conditions in the host countries, including crowded camps
▶ Loss of income
▶ Unemployment (in the host countries and in the countries of origin)
▶ Poor welfare state in the countries of origin

Intra-EU labour migration (mobility)

Freedom of movement has been the cornerstone of the European Union for nearly three decades but the COVID-19 pandemic has put a chill on this right, both as a result of national government actions to contain the spread of the virus and workers’ own hesitance to travel in an era of social distancing and uncertain times.

In March, a number of European governments (including Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia, and Spain) unilaterally closed their borders with neighboring EU countries, cancelled international flights, or imposed border checks in an emergency attempt to stop the spread of the coronavirus. These measures were joined by the temporary closure of the European Union’s external borders to most nonresidents, as well as domestic lockdowns in many Member States imposing restrictions on nonessential movement.

These restrictions have not only affected freedom of movement but intra-EU labor mobility as well. Frontier workers who live in one EU country but work in another can no longer commute as easily. For instance, Poles who pre-pandemic commuted for work in nearby German towns protested the mobility restrictions as a threat to their jobs. There are also indications that the lockdown has affected long-term mobile workers, who habitually reside and work in another EU Member State. As of late March, more than 200,000 Romanian workers - currently the largest group of EU-27 free movers - had returned to Romania from EU

countries most hit by the pandemic for reasons that may include precarious employment conditions, loss of income, as well as limited health insurance and social security coverage.

Border closures and restrictions on the mobility of EU workers are likely to be temporary and already there are signs of employers engaging in workarounds, such as British and German companies arranging special flights to receive seasonal workers. For many eastern Europeans, though, this is their only way to make ends meet. Lack of proper health care insurance, social protection, and adequate working conditions for eastern European workers, both at home and in the host countries, have already been a serious problem in the past (Andriescu 2020).

Migration flows to/from Balkan countries

Before the COVID-19 crisis, Balkan countries became a buffer zone for many migrants and refugees. For example, according to pre-crisis estimates by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) only a small number of migrants entering Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) desire to stay in the country and instead seek to reach Western EU countries.

According to IOM estimates around 6,000 migrants and refugees were placed in quarantine camps during the pandemic. It was recorded by civil society organizations that in such camps people slept in tents close to each other and if they tried to leave the camp violence by the local police was observed. Many more migrants and refugees stayed outside the camps in hostels abandoned buildings or outdoors. In late April, the BiH Minister of Security stated that as BiH has an obligation to accept refugees from Syria, migrants from other countries will have to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In Serbia, even before the government restricted movement, migrants and refugees were caught on the streets and taken to camps. During the state of emergency due to COVID-19, they do not have the opportunity to initiate an asylum procedure and regulate their status. The Commissariat for Refugees and Migration of Serbia stated on April 23 that more than 8,800 refugees, migrants and asylum seekers have been in complete quarantine in special camps since March 15, 2020 (Bogdanović 2020).

The situation in Balkan countries is aggravated by the fact that many migrant workers from Western European countries returned home due to the COVID-19 crisis. According to official data, 75,000 people returned to Serbia before early March. However, the media reported that about 400,000 people had returned to Serbia. About 24,000 Croats returned to their country, while about 27,000 returned to Albania, mostly from Italy and Greece in the first half of March. 200,000 people returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. All these people would need to follow self-isolation requirements for at least two weeks and most likely would stay unemployed in their home countries with very weak welfare and social security systems in place (BIRN 2020).

Migration flows from Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine

After COVID-19 pandemic hit Western Europe, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine witnessed massive return of their citizens.

In March 2020 over 40,000 Moldavian citizens returned to the country and around 7,000 were seeking help to return home. Most of the workers were employed in Italy, Spain, France and Israel and they have been hardest hit by the wave of factory closures, temporary layoffs and the almost complete shutdown of tourism across Europe. The return back home was not easy for Moldavian citizens as the government of Moldova was not ready for such development. Igor Dodon, the president of Moldova asked Moldovans abroad “to stay where you are” during the pandemic. The government even insisted that Moldovans would be allowed to fly home only if they bought €200 worth of medical insurance before boarding a plane. Following an outcry, it said returnees would have to take out private medical insurance within three days of arriving back in the country (Hutuleac 2020).

Ukrainians belong to the largest migrant groups with valid residence permits in the EU. According to Eurostat and the Ukrainian State Statistics Service, Poland, Italy, Czechia and Hungary represented the leading destinations for Ukrainian citizens in terms of all valid permits for remunerated activities before COVID-19. Many more migrant workers from Ukraine went to work in EU countries without permit documents using the advantage of a visa-free regime. IOM estimates that before the COVID-19 crisis that around 3 million of Ukrainians worked abroad and about 20-25% came back due to pandemic. The majority of an

estimated 3 million Ukrainian migrant workers abroad were employed in low-skill occupations and even small disruptions in income or an increase in expenses could have a crippling effect on them and their families. Migrants engaged in informal employment will face even greater dangers of unemployment and exploitation. Facing the brunt of job cuts, Ukrainian migrants returned home and had to look for new sources of income in conditions of an equally, or worse, affected domestic economy.

In this situation the Ukrainian government made paradoxical decisions. On one side the Ukrainian government made a return home journey difficult for migrant workers. Ukraine closed most of its border crossing points and banned cross-border bus, pedestrian and train traffic on 16 March. The only remaining option was to travel by car. Many Ukrainian migrants based in Poland and Hungary desperately tried to return home as soon as possible, which led to queues and crowds at the open border posts. Meanwhile, those without a car had to wait at checkpoints for special shuttle buses. On the other side, the Ukrainian government did not allow Ukrainian workers who were invited to work in Western European countries to leave home for work. That was the case of 14,000 construction workers who were invited to work in Finland. These workers are unemployed in their own country and cannot go to work abroad (Prague Process 2020).

Regarding migrant workers from Georgia, they faced enormous challenges to return home as Georgia implemented strict travel restrictions and closed its borders. For example, there are around 9,500 Georgians legally working in Poland. Many have suddenly found themselves out of work due to the mass closure of businesses and could not return home. Another challenge is related to the fact that 78,000 foreign nationals were classified as immigrants in Georgia in 2019. The majority of these people were locked in the country and reported loss of income, especially people who worked in professions affected by COVID-19, or those who relied on part-time, informal jobs to support their studies and living costs (International Organization for Migration 2019) (KNOMAD 2020).

Migration in CIS countries

Even borders that are usually open, such as between Russia and Central Asia (CA), hardened as COVID-19 spread through the region. Hundreds of migrant workers from Central Asian countries were stranded at various airports after Russia and other neighboring countries closed borders and grounded flights to the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, forcing them to camp out at the terminals for weeks until the issue was resolved by their respective governments. Adding to the bottleneck at airports, the travel bans coincided with spring celebrations in Central Asia when many migrant workers return home after laboring through the winter.

The COVID-19 crisis also revived the discussion in Russia and CA countries on migration as travel restrictions or border closings highlighted the vulnerability of stranded migrant workers exposed to unhygienic conditions in crowded airports, unable to self-quarantine and with limited or no access to medical services.

Workers from CA countries who managed to return home found themselves in a very difficult situation as they were contained in special hostels and dorms for two weeks quarantine and then had to observe self-isolation measures at home without any income support from the state.

High dependence on remittances from Russia is likely to increase the impact of negative external shocks on the Central Asian economies of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Remittances sent home by millions of expatriate workers in Russia, most of them employed in the construction sector, account for about two-thirds of GDP in both the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. The Kyrgyz Republic saw remittances fall 9 percent in the first two months of 2020 compared with the same period the previous year (KNOMAD 2020).

Examples of EU countries' migration legislation and practice

In the EU, public policies affecting migration and the surrounding political discourse in the middle of the pandemic have taken different paths. The Italian Minister for Agriculture Teresa Bellanova (Italia Viva party), stated that in times of coronavirus "we truly realize that it is we who need the immigrants" rather than them who need us. In mid-March, she called for the immediate regularisation of 600,000 undocumented

workers in agriculture and the care sector with temporary residence permits of six months (renewable for another six months) “in order to get the economy moving again.” (Roland 2020)

Portugal announced that it will grant temporary residence permits to all asylum seekers who had their applications pending. Sweden announced a 12-month extension to several labour market integration programs allowing migrants whose subsidies would expire in the near future to remain employed. Spain loosened its regime of immigration detention. Germany suspended the use of the Dublin regulation – the law that determines which EU state is responsible for examining an application for asylum. Ireland said it will respect a firewall for any undocumented people seeking healthcare or social services during the pandemic: they will not be reported to immigration or the police. Forced deportations are also down. The Irish government introduced a pandemic unemployment payment that covers regular and irregular migrant workers.

But Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Cyprus and Slovenia have temporarily suspended access to asylum, and Hungary has cancelled the right to asylum altogether because of “risk related to the spread of COVID-19” (Fasani 2020).

Many governments and businesses in Western Europe have pushed for travel exemptions for Eastern Europeans in order to tackle the dire shortages of seasonal labour at this time of the year. On March 30, the European Commission released new “practical advice” to ensure that cross-border and frontier workers within the EU, in particular those with critical professions, can reach their workplace. The definition of “critical professions” is extremely flexible: “This includes but is not limited to those working in the health care and food sectors, and other essential services like childcare, elderly care, and critical staff for utilities.” (Manès Weisskircher 2020).

Conclusions

The COVID-19 crisis has reminded everyone that migrants are essential to the economies and societies of Europe. It has already led to reconsidering priorities and changes in immigration policies in some European countries (for example Italy, Portugal and Sweden) for key sectors and to including low-skilled labourers, such as seasonal workers. In other European countries (for example, Hungary, Greece) the COVID-19 crisis has strengthened far-right populist rhetoric and anti-migrant policies.

The Covid-19 pandemic risks deepening persistent inequalities between Western and Southeastern Europe (including non-EU countries), reinforcing the peripheral status of the latter. Even before the crisis, countries in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe were already among the poorest and most unequal on the continent. In the past, countries like Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, Serbia or Poland imported cheap labour from non-EU neighbor countries such as Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia where wages were even lower. The pandemic worsened even this mechanism: since the opening of the Covid-19 crisis and the closing of the Schengen borders, these sources of a cheap workforce vanished. In the end, migrant workers are the ones paying the price of their country’s peripheral position, having to choose between staying unemployed or exposing themselves to more dangerous working conditions at home or abroad and getting poor wages for their hard work.

The COVID-19 crisis has also exposed anti-humanitarian policies that countries in Europe have implemented towards refugees. These policies put refugees in a situation when they have had no choice but to stay in crowded refugee camps in unrelentingly harsh conditions with high risk of virus contagion.

The Covid-19 pandemic could also become an opportunity to reconsider business models and migration policies. It could encourage policy makers in Europe to cooperate closely and rethink the continent’s approach to migrant workers by raising wages, improving working conditions and securing access to social security systems.

Trade unions and civil society organizations should strengthen their cooperation in Europe and advocate for urgent measures and structural reforms to address the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on migrant workers. These measures and reforms should aim to improve the working and living conditions of migrant workers and refugees on sustainable bases and improve the functioning of work-permit systems.

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown the extremely interconnected nature of the world that leaves everyone vulnerable to a breakdown at a global scale. But some people are more vulnerable than others. The risks undertaken and the vulnerable position of migrant workers and refugees has gained more visibility because of the pandemic but these conditions have been there for many years. Actions to ensure migrant workers' rights are important in the short and longer term as the current reality underscores that migrant workers are crucial for national economies in Europe.

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Abbreviations and definitions

EU	European Union
EFTA	European Free Trade Association (Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway)
EUEA	Eurasian Economic Union
EU-LFS	EU Labour Force Survey
EU 28 \ EFTA movers	EU or EFTA citizens who reside in an EU or EFTA country rather than their country of citizenship
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
IDP	Internally displaced persons
Europe (for the purpose of the paper)	EU\EFTA countries, EUEA countries, Balkan countries, CIS countries, Turkey and the UK
EU Mobility	EU or EFTA citizens moving their habitual residence to another Member State/EFTA country other than their citizenship and/or working in a different Member State/EFTA country than the one where they reside (cross-border workers).
Labour Migration	Labour migration is defined as the movement of persons from their home State to another State for the purpose of employment (including labour mobility in EU)
Migrant workers	Persons who moved from their home State to another State for the purpose of employment (including labour mobility in EU)
Irregular migrant workers	Irregular (unauthorized or undocumented) migrant workers are persons who are employed without legal authorization to work

Migration flows in Europe: Before and During the COVID-19 Crisis

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